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August 13,2009
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Re:

State v. Hurt, 20080662-CA
Utah R. App. P. 240')

Dear Ms. Collins:
After briefing in this case, the Tenth Circuit issued significant new authority: United
States v. McCane,
F.3d
, 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A. 10 (Okla.)) (attached). McCane
supports the State's argument that even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred here, the exclusionary rule should not apply to non-culpable officer conduct. See,
e.g., Br. of Aple. at 18-21 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), United States v. Herring,
U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009)).
McCane was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at *2. On
appeal, McCane challenged the seizure of a firearm during a search of his car incident to his
arrest for a traffic offense. Id. While McCane's case was pending before the Tenth Circuit,
the United States Supreme Court issued Arizona v. Gant,
U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 1710,1714
(2009), which limited an officer's authority to search a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest.
The parties agreed that Gant rendered the search of McCane's car improper, but disagreed
that suppression was the appropriate remedy. McCane, 2009 WL 2231658 at *2. The Tenth
Circuit "agreed with the government that it would be proper . . . to apply the good-faith
exception to a search justified under the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals,
but later rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court decision." Id. at *6. Accordingly,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's admissibility ruling under the good-faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id.

LETTER PAGE TWO
The Tenth Circuit's decision supports the State's position: The exclusionary rule
should not apply to officer conduct that was lawful before Gant overturned a longstanding
practice that was uniformly accepted in Utah and nationwide.
This case is set for oral argument at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, 28 September 2009.
Sincerely,

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

copy: Dana M. Facemyer
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H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Markice Lavert McCANE Defendant-Appellant
No. 08-6235.
July 28, 2009
Background: Defendant was convicted of being a
felon m possession of a firearm after the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Robm J Cauthron, Chief Judge. 2008 WL
2740926, denied his motion to suppress evidence,
and defendant appealed
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Murphy, Circuit
Judge, held that
(1) evidence gathered m invalid search of car was
admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and
(2) e\idence was sufficient to support the conviction
Affirmed

Tymkovich, J , filed concurring opinion
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal La* 110 €==>394.4(9)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 E\ idence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394 4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k394 4(9) k Arrest or Stop,
Search Incidental To, Validity of Stop or Arrest
Most Cited Cases

Although the arresting officer's search of the car the
defendant had been driving was not a \alid search
incident to arrest because the defendant was already
handcuffed and seated m the police patrol car at the
time of the search, evidence gathered in the search
was admissible under the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule m the prosecution of the defendant for being a felon m possession of a firearm,
since the validity of the search under the Fourth
Amendment as a search incident to arrest was supported at the time of the search by settled case law
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which was subsequently abrogated by a Supreme Court decision
that was issued after the search of the defendant's
car U S C A Const Amend 4
[2] Criminal Law 110 €==>394.4(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
11 OXVII(I) Competency m General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394 4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k3944(l) k In General Most
Cited Cases
The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, that is, that a search or arrest was unreasonable, does not necessanly mean that the exclusionary' rule applies U S C A Const Amend 4
[3] Criminal La* 110 €=>394.4(1)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
11 OXVII(I) Competency m General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394 4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k3944(l) k In General Most
Cited Cases
The exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations is not an individual right and applies only
where it results m appreciable deterrence U S C A
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_ F.3d — , 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.)))
Const.Amend. 4
[4] Criminal Law 110 €=>394.4(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(I) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k394.4(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Because the purpose of the exclusionary rule for
Fourth Amendment violations is to deter police
misconduct, in determining whether to apply the
rule, the court is to weigh the benefits of the resulting deterrence against the costs of applying the
rule. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[5] Criminal Law 110 €=>1139
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)13 Review De Novo
110kll39 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
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110XXIV(M) Presumptions
1 lOkl 144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
1 lOkl 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
llOkl 144.13(5) k. Inferences or
Deductions from Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>1159.2(7)
110 Crim^al Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(P) Verdicts
1 lOkl 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict
110k 1159.2 Weight of Evidence in
General
llOkl 159.2(7)
k.
Reasonable
Doubt. Most Cited Cases
The court of appeals reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, asking only whether taking the evidence, both direct
and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the government, a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[6] Criminal Law 110 €=>1159.2(7)

Criminal Law 110 €==> 1144.13(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(M) Presumptions
110k! 144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
110k 1144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
110k! 144.13(2)
Construction
of
Evidence
llOkl 144.13(3) k. Construction
in Favor of Government, State, or Prosecution.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>1144.13(5)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(P) Verdicts
1 lOkl 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict
llOkl 159.2 Weight of Evidence in
General
llOkl 159.2(7)
k.
Reasonable
Doubt. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>1159.2(9)
110 CriminaH*aw
U0XXI\LReView
HOXXIV(P) Verdicts
1 lOkl 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict
llOkl 159.2 Weight of Evidence in
General
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110k! 159 2(9) k
ence Most Cited Cases

Weighing Evid-

Criminal Law 110 €>=>1159.4(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIY Review
IIOXXIV(P) Verdicts
110k! 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict
llOkl 159 4 Credibility of Witnesses
110kll59 4(l) k In General Most
Cited Cases
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the court of appeals does not assess the credibility of vv itnesses or weigh conflicting evidence and may reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
[7] Weapons 406 €=>4
406 Weapons
406k4 k Manufacture, Sale, Gift, Loan, Possession, Qr Use Most Cited Cases
Possession of a firearm for purposes of the offense
of being a felon m possession of a firearm can be
either actual or constructive 18 U S C A ^
922(g)(1)

Paee 3

406k 17 Criminal Prosecutions
406kl7(4) k Weight and Sufficiency of
Evidence Most Cited Cases
The evidence that defendant had constructive possession over the firearm that was found in the
vehicle the defendant had been driving was sufficient to support his con\iction for being a felon m
possession of a firearm, police officer who found
the firearm testified that it was located in the side
pocket of the driver's door, withm inches of the defendant's reach when he was in the driver's seat and
the door was shut, and officer testified that upon
seeing the firearm, defendant said that he had forgotten that it was there 18 U S C A § 922(g)(1)
[10] Weapons 406 €=>17(2)
406 Weapons
406k 17 Criminal Prosecutions
406kl7(2) k Presumptions and Burden of
Proof Most Cited Cases
For purposes of the offense of being a felon m possession of a firearm, when a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises on which a firearm is
found, knowledge, domimon, and control can be
properly inferred because of the exclusive possession alone 18 U S C A § 922(g)(1)
[H] Weapons 406 €=>17(2)

[8] Weapons 406 €^=>4
406 Weapons
406k4 k Manufacture, Sale, Gift, Loan. Possession, or Use Most Cited Cases
For purposes of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, actual possession exists when
a person has direct physical control over a firearm
at a given time, and constructive possession exists
when a person knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over a firearm
1 8 U S C A § 922(g)(1)
[9] Weapons 406 €=>17(4)
406 Weapons

406 Weapons
406kl7 Criminal Prosecutions
406k 17(2) k Presumptions and Burden of
Proof Most Cited Cases
W capons 406 €^> 17(4)
406 Weapons
406kl7 Criminal Prosecutions
406kl7(4) k Weight and Sufficiency of
Evidence Most Cited Cases
For purposes of establishing constructive possession of a firearm m a prosecution for being a felon
m possession of a firearm proximity alone is insufficient to establish knowledge of and access to and
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dominion and control over a firearm m a joint occupancy case, but when combined with other evidence
in the case linking the defendant to the firearm,
proximity is material and probative evidence that
may be considered m deciding whether a defendant
had knowledge of and access to and dominion and
control over the firearm 18 U S C A § 922(g)(1)
[12] Commerce 83 €=>82.50
83 Commerce
8311 Apphcalion to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and Regulations
83k82 50 k Weapons and Explosives
Most Cited Cases
Weapons 406 €=>3
406 Weapons
406k3 k Constitutional, Statutory, and Local
Regulations Most Cited Cases
The statute criminalizing being a felon m possession of a firearm does not violate the Commerce
Clause, even where the crime's only connection to
interstate commerce is the firearm's crossing of
state lmes U S C A Const Art 1, (j 8, cl 3, 18
U S C A § 922(g)
William H Campbell, Campbell Law Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant

*1 In April 2007, Defendant-Appellant Markice
McCane was stopped for a suspected traffic violation by an Oklahoma City police officer After determining McCane was driving under a suspended
license, the officer arrested McCane, handcuffed
him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol
car The officer then conducted a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and discovered a
firearm m the pocket of the driver's side door McCane was charged with being a felon m possession
of a firearm m violation of 18 U S C § 922(g)(1)
McCane filed a motion to suppress the firearm as
fruit of an unlawful search The district court
denied the motion, concluding the search was properly undertaken as incident to a lawful arrest While
the case was pending on appeal, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona \
Gant, — U S — , 129 S Ct 1710, 173 L Ed 2d 485
(2009) In Gant, the Court concluded a vehicle
search is not valid as incident to a lawful arrest
when a defendant is stopped fox a traffic violation
and handcuffed m the back of the patrol car at the
time of the search Id at 1719 In light of Gant, the
district court erred m concluding the search was
valid as incident to a lawful arrest Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U S C § 1291, we nevertheless affirm the district court's denial of the motion
to suppress based upon the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule

n. BACKGROUND
Edwaid J Kumiega, Assistant United States Attorney (John C Richter, United States Attorney, with
him on the bnefs), Oklahoma City, OK, for
Plaintiff-Appellee
Before
MURPHY,
ANDERSON,
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges
MURPHY, Circuit Judge

and

On April 18, 2007, Officer Aaron Ulman of the Oklahoma City Police Department was patrolling his
precinct when he observed a vehicle traveling eastbound on a four-lane thoroughfare The vehicle was
straddling the center line of the two eastbound
lanes After following the vehicle for approximately
three blocks, Officer Ulman decided to conduct a
tiaffic stop based upon his belief the driver was violating state traffic law and his suspicion the driver
was intoxicated After pulling the vehicle over to
the side of the road, Officer Ulman approached the

I. INTRODUCTION
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vehicle and asked the driver, later identified as McCane, for his license and insurance information. A
passenger, Joseph Carr, was also in the vehicle.
After McCane informed him that his license was
suspended, Officer Ulman asked McCane to exit
the vehicle and accompany him to the patrol car.
McCane complied, and Carr remained in the front
seat of the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, McCane left the driver's door open, and the door remained open for the duration of the stop. Officer
Ulman conducted a pat-down search of McCane
and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car.
Officer Ulman then conducted a records check,
which indicated McCane's license was suspended
and the vehicle was not registered to McCane. At
that time, Officer Ulman arrested McCane for driving with a suspended license, placed him in handcuffs, and again placed him in the back seat of the
patrol car. After requesting dispatch to contact a
wrecker service to tow the vehicle, Officer Ulman
asked Carr to exit the vehicle and sit in the back
seat of the patrol car along with McCane. Carr did
so, and Officer Ulman then searched the passenger
compartment of the car.
*2 During the search. Ulman discovered a .25
caliber firearm hidden under a rag in the side pocket of the open door. The firearm was loaded with a
magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition.
Officer Ulman removed the firearm from the
vehicle and took it back to the patrol car in order to
secure it. The patrol car was parked directly behind
McCane's vehicle. According to Officer Ulman,
when McCane saw the firearm he stated, "I forgot
that was even there,"Officer Ulman then advised
McCane of his Miranda rights {Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 LJBd.2d 694
(1966)), and McCane did not make any additional
statements. After the vehicle was impounded, Carr
was released, and McCane was transported to the
police station for booking.
McCane was charged with being a felon in posses-

sion of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Before the district court, McCane filed
motions to suppress the firearm and exclude his alleged inculpatory statement. The district court
denied these motions, concluding the statement was
made voluntarily and the search of McCane's
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was properly undertaken as a search incident to lawful arrest Following a jury trial, McCane
was found guilty of the charged offense. McCane
then appealed to this court alleging: (1) the district
court erred in denying his pretrial motions to suppress the evidence stemming from the search of his
vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence existed from
which to convict him of the offense; and (3) the
felon in possession statute at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008).
While the case was pending before this court, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v.
Gant. — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct 1710. 173 L.Ed.2d
485.On facts almost identical to the facts of this
case, the Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not applicable when a defendant has been arrested for a
traffic violation and remains handcuffed in the back
of a patrol car while the search is conducted. Id. at
1719.After noting that lower courts have widely upheld searches "in this precise factual scenario," the
Court stated that an officer may "search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search" or when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle." Id. at 1718-19 (quotations omitted).
The parties agree that, in light of Gant, the district
court erred in denying the"motion to suppress the
firearm on the grounds that the search was proper
as incident to lawful arrest. The parties disagree,

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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however, as to whether the district court's denial of
the motion to suppress can be affirmed on an alternative ground Thus, the issues now before the court
are (1) whether the district court's denial of the
motion to suppress the firearm may be affirmed
based upon the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule or the inevitable discovery doctrine, (2)
whether sufficient evidence existed on which to
convict McCane, and (3) whether 18 U S C §
922(g) is constitutional FN1

III. DISCUSSION
A Motion to Suppress
*3 [1] This court may affirm the distnct court on
any basis supported by the record Kellogg v
Metro Life Ins Co 549 F 3d 818, 825 (10th
Cir2008) As an alternative ground for affirming
the district court's decision to deny the motion to
suppress the fiiearm as fruit of an unlawful search,
the government claims that Officer Ulman reasonably relied upon settled pre- Gant Tenth Circuit
case law, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be extended to this
search FN2To prevail on this alternative ground,
the government must establish that the search of the
vehicle was supported by extant Tenth Circuit precedent and that the principle of deterrence underlying the exclusionary rule is not undermined

1 Pre- Gant Tenth Circuit Precedent
The Supreme Court m Gant expressed concern that
its precedent, New York v Belton, 453 U S 454,
101 S Ct 2860. 69 LEd2d 768 (1981), was being
generally applied far beyond the underlying justifications for warrantless vehicle searches incident
to arrest of a recent occupant, l e , officer safety and
preservation of evidence Gant 129 S Ct at
1718-19 It observed that Be!ton"has been widely
understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no pos-

Page6

sibility the arrestee could gam access to the vehicle
at the time of the search "Id at 1718 Tenth Circuit
precedent antecedmg Gant was not an exception
The decision m United States v Humphrey, 208
F 3d 1190 (10th Cir 2000), is exemplary of this circuit's precedent and is factually indistinguishable
from the instant case In Humphrey, the defendant
was stopped for a traffic violation, arrested on the
basis of an outstanding warrant, and handcuffed m
the patrol car at the time of the search of his
vehicle See id at 1202 The defendant's arguments
that neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence were m play were to no avail Id This court
held the search was proper "without regard to the
fact that the search occurred after Defendant had
been restrained and without regard to the nature of
the offense for which he was arrested " Id (citation
omitted) Other circuit opinions are consistent with
Humphrey™ United States \ Brothers, 438 F 3d
1068, 1073 (10th Cir2006) (upholding search undertaken incident to lawful arrest after the defendant had been restrained, but before the defendant
was removed from the scene of the arrest) FN4,
United States v Cotton 751 F 2d 1146, 1148-49
(10th Cn 1985), hinted States x MiopJn, 221
FedAppx
715,
721-22
(10th
Cir2007)
(unpublished disposition) The search in this case
was wholly consistent with and supported by this
court's precedent pnor to Gant

2 Application of the Good-Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule
[2]"The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the
people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, but contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained m violation of
its commands " Herring v United States, —U S —, 129 SCt 695, 699, 172 L E d 2 d 496 (2009)
(quotations omitted) There is, however, the judicially created exclusionary rule which, when ap-

© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest No Claim to Ong US Gov Works
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plied, excludes evidence obtained m violation of
the Fourth Amendment from being used at trial Id
The exclusionary "rule is designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect" Id (quotation omitted) "The fact
that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred-i e,
that a search or arrest was unreasonable-does not
necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies " Id at 700
*4 [3][4]"The exclusionary rule is not an individual
right and applies only where it results m appreciable deterrence" Id (quotations omitted) Because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, United States \ Leon, 468
US 897, 906, 104 S Ct 3405, 82 LEd2d 677
(1984), in determining whether to apply the rule the
court is to weigh the benefits of the resulting deterrence against the costs of applymg the rule Herring, 129 S Ct at 700 "The principal cost of applymg the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly
dangerous defendants go free-something that offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system " Id at 701 (quotation omitted) Consequently,
"[t]he rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for
those urging its application" Id (quotation omitted)
Various pnnciples have been established to limit
the application of the exclusionary rule Id at
700 One such principle is the good-faith exception
Id at 701 In Leon, the Supreme Court established
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
declining to apply the exclusionary rule when police reasonably and m good faith relied upon a warrant subsequently declared invalid 468 U S at 922.
104 S Ct 3405 The Court, relying on the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule, determined it was
improper to apply the rule m this context, explaining
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of

judges and magistrates Second, there exists no
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction
of exclusion [ ] Third, and most important, we
discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to
a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect
on the issuing judge or magistrate . Judges and
magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team, as neutral judicial officers, they have
no stake m the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions The threat of exclusion thus cannot
be expected significantly to deter them
Id at 916-17 (footnote omitted) The Court concluded the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected,
and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable lav> enforcement activlty "Id at 919
In Illinois v Krull the Court extended the goodfaith exception to warrantless administrative
searches performed in reliance upon a statute later
declared unconstitutional 480 U S 340, 349-53,
107 SCt 1160, 94 L E d 2 d 364 (1987) The Court
first explained that applying the exclusionary rule
m this situation would have little deterrent effect on
the officer's actions, stating
Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment
of the legislature that passed the law If the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it pnor to
such a judicial declaration will not deter future
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who
has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce
the statute as wntten To paraphrase the Court's
comment m Leon Penalizing the officer for the
legislature's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to One US Gov Works
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*5 Id at 349-50, 107 S Ct 1160 (quotation omitted) The Court then noted that the exclusionary
rule was aimed at deterring misconduct on the part
of police, not legislators Id at 350, 107 S Ct
1160 To the extent consideration of the deterrent
effect upon legislators was appropriate, however,
the initial inquiry was whether there was "evidence
to suggest that legislators are inclined to ignore or
subvert the Fourth Amendment" Id (quotation
omitted) In answering this question m the negative,
the Court stated that, "[although legislators are not
neutral judicial officers, as are judges and magistrates, neither are they adjuncts to the law enforcement team " Id at 350-51, 107 S Ct 1160 (citation
and quotation omitted) In enacting laws to carry
out the criminal justice system, "legislators' deliberations of necessity are significantly different from
the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer
engaged m the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" Id at 351. 107 S Ct 1160
(quotation omitted) Finally, the Court noted that
even if it were to conclude that legislators were distinguishable from officers of the judicial system,
there was "no reason to believe that applying the
exclusionary rule will have [a deterrent] effect Legislators enact statutes for broad, programmatic
purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence
m particular criminal investigations" Id at 352,
107 SCt 1160
The Court next extended the good-faith exception
to police reliance upon mistaken information m a
court's database indicating an arrest warrant was
outstanding Arizona v Evans 514 U S 1 14-16,
115 SCt 1185, 131 LEd2d 34 (1995) In Evam,
the Court explained that the mistake of a judicial
employee would not justify exclusion of evidence
for three reasons (1) the exclusionary rule was established to deter police misconduct, not the conduct of court employees, (2) there was no evidence
court employees were likely to "ignore or subvert
the Fourth Amendment", and (3) there was no basis
for believing application of the exclusionary rule

Page 8

would deter the conduct at issue since "court clerks
are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged m the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out enme, they have no stake m the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions" Id at 14-15. 115
S Ct 1185 (citation omitted)
Finally, m its recent good-faith decision, Herring
the Court extended the good-faith exception to police reliance upon the negligent mistake of a fellow
law enforcement employee, as opposed to a neutral
third party 129 SCt at 704 In Hen nig the court
applied the good-faith exception where, m making
an arrest, police relied upon a record-keeping error
m the police computer database indicating there
was an active warrant for the arrestee Id at 698,
702-04 In discussing the principles of the exclusionary rule, the Court stated that "[t]he extent to
which the exclusionary rule is justified by [ ] deterrence principles vanes with the culpability of the
law enforcement conduct" Id at 701 Thus,
"assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus of
applying the exclusionary rule" Id (quotation
omitted)
*6 The Court went on to explain that "evidence
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment" Id (quotations omitted) As such,
"the [past] abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary
rule featured intentional conduct that was patently
unconstitutional" Id at 702 The Court concluded
the conduct at issue did not rise to this level, clarifying that the good-faith inquiry "is confined to the
objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that
the search was illegal m light of all of the circumstances " Id at 703 (quotations omitted)
Two inseparable principles have emerged from the
Supreme Court cases and each builds upon the un-

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

... F 3d —
. . . p 3d — 2009 WL 2231658 (C A 10 (Okla))
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (CA.10 (Okla.)))
derlymg purpose of the exclusionary rule deterrence First, the exclusionary rule seeks to deter
objectively unreasonable police conduct, I e , conduct which an officer knows or should know violates the Fourth Amendment See, eg, Hemng 129
SCt at 701-04, Krull 480 U S at 348-49, 107
S Ct 1160 Second, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement officers, not other entities, and even if it was appropriate to consider the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on other institutions, there would be no
significant deterrent effect m excluding evidence
based upon the mistakes of those umnvolved in or
attenuated from law enforcement See eg, Exam
514 U S at 14-15, 115 SCt 1185 Krull 480 US
at 351-52, 107 SCt 1160, Leon 468 U S at
916-17, 104 SCt 3405 Based upon these principles, we agree with the government that it would
be proper for this court to apply the good-faith exception to a search justified under the settled case
law of a United States Court of Appeals, but later
rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court decision
Just as there is no misconduct on the part of a law
enforcement officer who reasonably relies upon the
mistake of a court employee m entering data,
Evans, 514 U S at 15, 115 S Ct 1185, or the mistake of a legislature m passing a statute later determined to be unconstitutional, Krull 480 U S at
349-50, 107 S Ct 1160 a police officer who undertakes a search m reasonable reliance upon the
settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals, even though the search is later deemed invalid by Supreme Court decision, has not engaged m
misconduct rN4The refrain in Leon and the succession of Supreme Court good-faith cases is that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied to
"objectively reasonable law enforcement activity"
486 U S at 919, 108 SCt 2218 Relying upon the
settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals
certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior

Paee9

The Supreme Court's line of good-faith cases
clearly indicates that the reach of the exclusionary
rule does not extend beyond police conduct to punish the mistakes of others, be they judicial officers
or employees, or even legislators E^ans 514 US
at 14 115 S Ct 1185 (u[T]he exclusionary rule was
historically designed as a means of deterring police
misconduct, not mistakes by court employees"),
Krull 480 U S at 350, 107 S Ct 1160 ("We noted
m Leon as an initial matter that the exclusionary
rule was aimed at deterring police misconduct
Thus, legislators, like judicial officers are not the
focus of the rule "(citation omitted)), Leon 468
U S at 916, 104 SCt 3405 ("[T]he exclusionary
rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather
than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates ") In the case of judicial officers, the Supreme Court has stated that "there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment
or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion " Leon, 468 U S at 916, 104 SCt 3430 Thus there is
no basis for believing that excluding evidence resulting from an error of the court will "have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge[s]"
Id Courts are neutral arbiters charged with interpreting the law, and have "no stake in the outcome
of particular criminal prosecutions " Id at 917, 104
S Ct 3430 Consequently, excluding evidence based
on judicial error would serve no deterrent purpose
The Supreme Court has consistently relied upon the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule m deciding the scope of the good-faith exception The
Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule
when no deterrent effect would result from its application Consistent with this practice, this court
declines to apply the exclusionary rule when law
enforcement officers act in objectively reasonable
reliance upon the settled case law of a United States
Court of Appeals*™0 The good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule applies in this case The district court therefore properly denied the motion to
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suppress
B Sufficiency of the Evidence
*7 [5][6] This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence, "ask[mg] only whether taking the evidence both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom-m the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" United States v
Brown 400 F 3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir2005)
(quotation omitted) This court does not "assess the
credibility of witnesses or weigh conflicting evidence .. [and] may reverse only if no rational tner of
fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt" Id (quotation
omitted) "In order to obtain a conviction against [a
defendant] under § 922(g), the government was required to prove that [the defendant] had previously
been convicted of a felony, [the defendant] thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm, and such possession was m or affected interstate commerce"
United States v Michel 446 F 3d 1122, 1128 (10th
Cir 2006)
[7][8][9] McCane claims there was insufficient
evidence from which the jury could find he had
possession of the firearm Possession of a firearm
for purposes of 18 U S C ^ 922(g)(1) can be either
actual or constructive Id "Actual possession exists
when a person has direct physical control over a
firearm at a given time " United States v Jameson,
478 F3d 1204, 1209 flOth Cir 2007) "Constructive
possession exists when a person knowingly holds
the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over a firearm " Id (quotation omitted)
[10][ll]"When a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises on which a firearm is found,
knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly
inferred because of the exclusive possession alone "
Id However, a[i]n cases of joint occupancy, where

the government seeks to prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present
evidence to show some connection or nexus
between the defendant and the firearm" Michel
446 F3d at 1128 (quotation omitted) "Proximity
alone [ ] is insufficient to establish knowledge and
access to (and dominion and control over) a firearm
m a joint occupancy case " Jameson, 478 F 3d at
1209 "But when combined with other evidence m
the case linking the defendant to the firearm, proximity is material and probative evidence that may
be considered m deciding whether a defendant had
knowledge of and access to (and dominion and control over) the [firearm] " Id "[A]n inference of constructive possession is reasonable if the conclusion
flows from logical and probabilistic reasoning"
Michel 446 F 3d at 1128-29 (quotation omitted)
Officer Ulman testified that the firearm was located
in the side pocket of the driver's door, "within
inches of reach [of McCane] whenever the door
[was] shut "In addition to his testimony regarding
the proximity of the firearm to McCane, Officer Ulman testified that upon seeing the firearm, McCane
stated, "I forgot that was even there "While McCane argues Officer Ulman was not a credible witness because he was "trying to save his felony arrest and obtain a conviction predicated on his actions," it was well withm the discretion of the jury
to credit Officer Ulman's testimony and this court
will not assess the credibility of a witness on appeal United States \ Winder, 557 F 3d 1129, 1137
(10th Cir 2009) McCane's statement, together with
the proximity of the firearm, supports the conclusion that McCane had knowledge of the firearm as
well as the power and ability to exercise dominion
and control over it See United States \ Hooks 551
F3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir 2009) (concluding defendant's inculpatory statements along with other
evidence regarding his earlier behavior and proximity to the firearm provided sufficient evidence from
which a jury could find constructive possession of a
firearm discovered beside a road) Thus, there exis-
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ted sufficient evidence from which the jury could
infer McCane s constructive possession of the firearm
C The Constitutionality of 18 bSC

§ 922(g)

*8 McCane first argues that m light of the Supreme
Courts decision m Heller in which the Court held
that the Second Amendment provides an individual
with a right to possess and use a handgun for lawful
purposes within the home, 128 S Ct at 2822,§
922(g) violates the Second Amendment The Supreme Court, however, explicitly stated m Hellei
that "nothing m our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" 128 S Ct at
2%\(y-\l see also United States \ Andeison 559
F3d 348, 352 & n 6 (5th Cn 2009) (rejecting the
argument that $> 922(g) is unconstitutional in light
of Heller)
[12] McCane next argues ^ 922(g) violates the
Commerce Clause where, as here, the crimes only
connection to interstate commerce is the firearm's
crossing of state lines This aigument also lacks
merit, as it has been explicitly rejected by this
court See eg Jjnited States \ bibano 563 F 3d
1150, 1154 (10th Cn2009) (rejecting Commerce
Clause challenge to § 922(g) based upon the alleged insufficient connection to interstate commerce and stating "if a firearm has traveled across
state lines, the minimal nexus with interstate commerce is met and the statute can be constitutionally
applied"), United States \ Bolton 68 F 3d 396, 400
(10th Cn 1995) (concluding "[§ ] 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause"
(quotation omitted)) Thus, we reject each of McCane's areuments challenging the constitutionality
of <? 922(g)

Pase11

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the decision of the district courtFN8
TYMKOVICH, J, concurring
I join in Judge Murphy's cogent opinion, but write
separately regarding certain issues raised by our
Second Amendment holding
Distnct of Columbia i Hellei instructs that it not
be taken "to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons " —
U S — 128 SCt 2783, 2816-17, 171 LEd2d
637 (2008) This instruction, as McCane points out,
is dictum But Supreme Court dicta binds us
' almost as firmly as
the Court s outright holdings " Swefoot LC i Sine Foot Coip 531 F 3d
1236, 1243 (10th Cir2008) (quoting Gavloi \
bmted States 74 F 3d 214 217 (10th Cir 1996))
This is particularly so where, as here, the dictum is
recent and not enfeebled by later statements See
id, see also Carlton F W Larson, Fow Exceptions
in Seaich of a Theory Distnct of Columbia v
Hellei and Judicial Ipse Dixit 60 Hastmgs L J
1371, 1372 (2009) ('Although [ Hellei s ]Exceptions are arguably dicta, they are dicta of the
strongest sort") I therefore concur with the majority m rejecting McCane s Second Amendment challenge
I write separately, though for two reasons The first
is to note given the undeveloped history of felon
dispossession laws the possible tension between
Hellei s dictum and its underlying holding The
second reason is to express concern that the dictum
inhibits lower courts from exploring the contours of
Hellei and its application to firearm restnctions
*9 My first point is that the felon dispossession
dictum may lack the "longstanding" historical basis
that Hellei asenbes to it Indeed the scope of what
Hellei describes as "longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons," 128 S Ct at
2816-17 is far from clear To be sure, some sources
would support the proposition See Robert Dowlut,
The Right to Aims Does the Constitution oi the

IV. CONCLUSION
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Predilection oj Judges Reign?,36 Okla LRev 65,
96 (1983) ("Colonial and English societies of the
eighteenth century
excluded
felons [from possessing firearm?]"), Don B Kates, Jr, Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment 82 Mich LRev 203, 266
(1983) ("Founders [did not] consider felons withm
the common law right to arms ")
But more recent authorities have not found evidence of longstanding dispossession laws On the
contrary, a number have specifically argued such
laws did not exisi and have questioned the sources
relied upon by the earlier authorities See, e g, Larson, supra, at 1374 (finding Kates's evidence of
longstanding felon dispossession "surprisingly
thin"), C Kevin Marshall, VITiy Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 695,
709-10, 714 (2009) (challenging the evidence cited
by both Dowlut and Kates) rN1 Instead, they assert, the weight of historical evidence suggests
felon dispossession laws are creatures of the twentieth-rather than the eighteenth-century See, eg,
Marshall, supia at 698-713 (comprehensively reviewing the history of state and federal dispossession laws), Larson, supra at 1374 ("[S]o far as 1
can determine, no colonial or state law m eighteenth-century America formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms "), Adam Winkler,
Heller's Catch 22 56 UCLA LRev 1551, 1561,
1563 (2009) (same) Together these authorities cast
doubt on a categorical approach to felon dispossession laws
This uncertain historical evidence is problematic in
light of Hellei 's Second Amendment interpretation
Central to the Court's holding are a detailed textual
analysis and a comprehensive review of the Second
Amendment's meaning at the time of its adoption
Heller 128 S Ct at 2788-816 Aftei conducting this
analysis and review, Heller concludes the right "to
keep and bear arms" is a corollary to the individual
right of self-defense Eg, id at 2817 ("[Tjhe inherent nght of self-defense has been central to the

Second Amendment nght") At the "core" of the
Second Amendment nght, the Court found, is selfdefense in the home Id at 2818
Knowing the meaning of the Second Amendment
right and having identified its individual nature, the
issue becomes what limits the government may
place on the nght Indeed, this is where the Second
Amendment rubber meets the road The restrictive
firearm ownership and licensing laws at issue m
Heller violated the right, the Court found Id at
2817-21 But what about other laws7 For example,
the broad scope of 18 U S C § 922(g)(l)-which
permanently disqualifies all felons from possessing
firearms-would conflict with the "core" self-defense right embodied in the Second Amendment
Non-violent felons, for example, certainly have the
same nght to self-defense m their homes as nonfelons The validity of § 922(g)(1) was not at issue
m Hellei, so presumably the lower courts would be
left to sort out this restnction-as well as other restnctions-and to wrestle with any complexities m
applying Hellei But the issue was not really left to
the lower courts
*10 In what could be descnbed as the opinion's
deus ex machina dicta, Hellei simply declared that
nothing in it "cast[s] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" or
various other gun control laws 128 S Ct at
2816-17 And that was it These provisions, and the
vanous regulations they encompassed, were supported without any explanation of how they would
fare m light of the Second Amendment's ongmal
meaning See id at 2827 (Stevens, J, dissenting),
id at 2869-70 (Breyer, J, dissenting)™ The
reason the Court inserted these exceptions is unclear Given the uncertain pedigree of felon dispossession laws, though, the dictum sanctioning their
application while simultaneously sidestepping the
Second Amendment's original meaning is odd One
wonders, at least with regard to felon dispossession,
whether the Hellei dictum has swallowed the
Heller rule
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Cn 2003) In declining to extend the goodfaith rule to reliance on circuit case law,
the court reasoned that u[s]uch expansion
of the good-faith exception would have undesirable, unintended consequences, principal among them being an implicit invitation to officers m the field to engage m the
tasks-better left to the judiciary and members of the bar more generally-of legal research and analysis" Id at 1076 In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit jurisprudence
supporting the search was settled Thus,
there was no risk that law enforcement officers would engage in the type of complex
legal research and analysis better left to the
judiciary and members of the bar
FN7 Because we uphold the search as valid under the good-faith doctrine, we need
not decide whether the denial of McCane's
motion to suppress could be affirmed
based upon the inevitable discovery doctrine
FN8 Appellant's motion to strike Appellee's Notice of Supplemental Authority
is denied
FN1 While Mr Kates does not address
this e\idence specifically, he maintains
"there is ample historical support for excluding [felons] from the right to arms
Nations which accepted the right to arms
invariably extended that right only to virtuous citizens, and at common law felons
were 'civilly dead,' having lost all rights
including the nght to possess property of
any kind "Don B Kates, A Modem Histonography of the Second Amendment, 56
UCLALRev 1211, 1231 n 100(2009)
FN2 In one sense, Heller did overturn
Tenth Circuit case law on this issue Previously, we upheld the felon-m-possession
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statute against Second Amendment attack
under a collective-rights theory-l e , that
felons have no right to possess firearms
that are not reasonably connected to military service See, eg, United States i
Baer, 235 F 3d 561, 564 (10th O r 2000)
(holding that the felon-m-possession statute does not violate the Second Amendment "absent evidence that [the firearms m
question] in any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated militia"), see generally David B Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Tenth Circuit Thee Decades
of (Mosth) Harmless Error %6 Dem
ULRev 901 (2009) The Heller dictum,
however, affirms the ultimate dispositionl e, that the Second Amendment does not
protect a felon's right to possess firearms
FN3 By my count, at least six other circuits have rejected post- Heller challenges
to the 18 U S C $ 922(g)(1) felon dispossession statute Almost all these decisions
cursorily cite the Hellei dictum, and almost all are unpublished See, eg, Lmted
States v Anderson 559 F 3d 348. 352 n 6
(5th Cir2009), United States \ Brve, 318
FedAppx
878, 879 (11th Cir200Q)
(unpublished). Lmted States \ Frazier,
314 FedAppx 801. 807 (6th Cir2008)
(unpublished), United States ^ Brumon,
292 FedAppx 259, 261 (4th Cir2008)
(unpublished), United States v Gilbert,
286 FedAppx 383. 386 (9th Cir2008)
(unpublished), Lmted States x Irish, 285
FedAppx
326, 327 (8th
Cir2008)
(unpublished)
CA 10(Okla).2009
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